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MONOPOLY-EXTENSION TOWARD PER SE VIOLATION
The Justice Department brought injunctive action under section 4
of the Sherman Act 1 against Grinnell Corporation and three affiliates
which Grinnell controlled through preponderant stock ownership. Grin-
nell manufactures automatic sprinklers, fire and burglar alarms, and
other machinery used in the alarm industry, and its affiliates are cor-
porations supplying subscriber-customers with fire and burglar alarm
services from central points through automatic alarm systems installed
on subscribers' premises. Defendants had acquired an 87 per cent
share of the accredited national Central Station Protective Service
(CSPS) market, attained through pre-affiHation market allocation
agreements between the affiliate corporations and their competitors,
discriminatory manipulation of prices to forestall competition in viola-
tion of Sherman Act section 1,2 and acquisition and dismantlement of
competing companies. Grinnell, in acquiring the preponderance of stock
in the affiliate corporations and directing the policy of the four corpora-
tions toward monopolization, violated section 2.1 Held: Where the
Government has borne the burden of defining the relevant market and
proving that defendant occupies an overwhelming share of that market,
a presumption arises that defendants have monopoly power and have
exercised that power in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act; this
presumption may be rebutted only by defendants' proving either that
monopoly power does not in fact exist, or that their dominance is the
result of superior skill, efficiency, foresight, or other legal means. United
States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964), prob. juris.
noted, 85 S.CT. 1538 (1965) (Nos. 1081-86, 1964 Term; renumbered
Nos. 73-77, 1965 Term).
1 Sherman Act § 4,26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1958), giving the
Attorney General of the United States power to institute equitable proceedings to pre-
vent and restrain violation of the Act.
2 Sherman Act § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958) : "Every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal:..."
a Sherman Act § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1958):
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of
a misdemeanor....
The remedies granted in the principle case were to enjoin further section 1 restraints
of trade, to require divestiture by Grinnell of all stock in the other defendant corpora-
tions, and to enjoin employment by any defendant of one Fleming, defendant's predom-
inant management leader.
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The monopolization charge in the principal case was based on section
2 of the Sherman Act, which establishes three separate offenses:
attempt to monopolize, conspiracy to monopolize, and monopolization,
of any part of interstate commerce.' The charge in Grinnell was
monopolization, the completed act prohibited by the statute. Histori-
cally, the elements in proving a charge of monopolization have been
definition of the relevant market, proof of monopoly power, and the
presence of that "deliberateness" which converts monopoly power to
monopolization.' The "relevant market" in the principal case is the
national Central Station Protective Service accredited by insurance
underwriters. This is the "area of effective competition"6 within which
defendants and competitors operate. "Monopoly power" is power to
control prices or exclude competition,7 the best proof of which is actual
use of such power. Absent proof of the exclusion of competitors or
price control, courts look to the relative size of defendant in the defined
market, freedom of entry, response of prices to changes in market sup-
ply and demand, and profit levels, to determine the existence of monop-
oly power.8 The third element is "deliberateness" by a defendant in
converting his monopoly power into a prohibited monopolization. Sec-
tion 2 does not require proof of specific intent,9 merely that monopoly
power be attained or maintained through deliberate acts. There must
be monopoly power plus "the purpose or intent to exercise that pow-
er."1 Historically, these three elements have been necessary to sustain
a monopolization charge. In practice, monopolization has been proved
4 See statute in note 3 supra. See generally ATr'y GEN. NAT'L CoMm. ANTITRUST
REP. 43 (1955).
5 ATry GEN. NATL COMm. ANTITRUST REP. 55 (1955).6 Standard Oil & Standard Stations v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 299 n.5 (1949).
For discussion of market definition generally, see United States v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) ; Note, The Market, a Concept it Antitrust, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 580 (1954); Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70
HARV. L. REV. 281 (1956).
7 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956) ; United
States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948).
s United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945). For an economic
analysis of such factors see MASSELL, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY, LEaAL AND Eco-
TuoMIC ISSUES 191-95 (1962). For a survey of the use of these factors to regulate the
size of industry, see KAYSEN & TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY, AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS 24-44 (1959).
9 United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945):
In order to fall within § 2, the monopolist must have both the power to monop-
olize, and the intent to monopolize. To read the passage as demanding any "spe-
cific" intent, makes nonsense of it, for no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of
what he is doing.
10 United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948); accord, American Tobacco
Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946).
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under two sets of circumstances: one, the acquisition and mainte-
nance of monopoly power through section 1 violations, 1 or, two,
monopoly power coupled with the use of such power to maintain
monopoly position even though not through prohibited restraints of
trade." A third circumstance has been mentioned in dicta, "that one
who has acquired an overwhelming share of the market 'monopolizes'
whenever he does business ... even if there is no showing that his busi-
ness involves any exclusionary practice."' 3
Grinnell extends the third set of circumstances. Looking to prior
monopolization cases, the court concluded that "to a moral certainty"
monopolies are the result of competitor acquisitions or section 1 re-
straints of trade. The court reasoned that the enormous amount of
testimony and trial time consumed by such cases has been due to a
lack of certainty by both lawyer and judge as to how such an antitrust
case will be viewed by the Supreme Court, coupled with judicial unwill-
ingness to take the risk of reversal which would accompany an effort
to draw sharp boundaries as to the relevance and materiality of evi-
dence and issues. The court noted development of section 1 per se rules
which are beyond presumptions, and are actually rules of law. An
irrebuttable per se rule is not possible because of the available defense
that monopoly power is "the result of superior skill, superior products,
natural advantages, technological or economic efficiency, scientific re-
search, low margins of profit maintained permanently and without
discrimination, legal licenses, or the like."' 4 Therefore, in an effort to
reduce the size of such cases and to effectuate certainty of issues and
evidence, Judge Wyzanski declared in the principal case that the gov-
ernment need prove only the relevant market and control of an over-
whelming (but mathematically undefinable) share of that market by
defendant. This set of facts creates a presumption of monopoly power
and monopolization in violation of section 2, and the burden of proof
"shifts" to defendant, not merely to introduce evidence to the contrary,
but to prove "that its eminence is traceable to such highly respectable
11 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61 (1911) ; United States v. Grif-
fith, 334 U.S. 100, 106 (1948).
' United States v. Griffith, supra note 11, at 107; United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521
(1954).
11 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., supra note 12, at 342, referring to
United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945). Judge Wyzanski
discussed the three tests in United Shoe, supra note 12, at 342.
4 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244, 248 (D.R.I. 1964).
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causes as superiority in means and methods which are 'honestly indus-
trial.' ")1
The proof needed to rebut this newly-created presumption was not
defined in the principal case. The court would seem to mean that the
"burden of persuasion" shifts to the defendant when it stated, "Unless
he [defendant] maintains the burden of proving himself within the ex-
ception, the occupant in the dominant position stands condemned...., 6
The direction of the principal case is away from what has historically
been the underlying theory of section 2 cases-the "Rule of Reason"-
and toward the "Per Se Doctrine." The Rule of Reason looks to all
the surrounding circumstances to determine whether the particular act
under investigation is an unreasonable restraint of trade." "Monopoly
in the concrete" is not prohibited by the Sherman Act 8 because of
faith by its framers that market forces would take care of monopoly
if the economy was kept free of unreasonable restraints on competition.
The result is a "flexible public policy directed against all undue limita-
tions on competition, both in the form of realized monopolization, and
in the lesser mode of partial but significant restraints of trade tending
to the same end."' 9 The policy is to favor competition and condemn
monopoly;2" under the Rule of Reason, the means is to restrict only
those restraints of trade which are unreasonable.
Implementing the same policy, but by a less flexible approach, is the
Per Se Doctrine. Under this approach, acts which restrict competition
by their inherent nature are illegal under the Sherman Act. Where the
purpose and effect of such acts are to restrain trade, they are deemed
violations of the Sherman Act without regard to reasonableness. 2'
In recent years, Clayton Act section 7 cases have used percentile
shares of the relevant market as an important factor in determining
whether mergers would result in lessening of competition. 2 Such is the
15 Id. at 248. This defense is generally referred to as the "thrust upon" defense, first
enunciated by Judge Hand in the United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945).
16 236 F. Supp. 244, 257 (D.R.I. 1964).
17 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) ; Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).Is Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61 (1911).
19 ATr'y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 8 (1955).
20 United States v. Aluminum Co. 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945) ; ATr'y GEN.
NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 11 (1955).
21 von Kalinowski, The Per Se Doctrine-An Emerging Philosophy of Antitrust
Law, 11 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 569 (1964).
22 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) ; Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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methodology of Grinnell, but, in effect, the decision declares a new rule
of substantive law for monopolization.
Dean Wigmore divides the burden of proof into two categories, the
burden of "risk of non-persuasion" and the duty to produce evidence
satisfying the judge that a directed verdict is not warranted. " The
first burden never shifts. The second burden, however, does shift. As
a trial proceeds, the duty to bring forth evidence may pass to the other
party as the result of a presumption which, unless met with contrary
evidence, compels decision against whomever the presumption arises.
Under this theory, presumptions pass the duty of producing contrary
evidence to the person against whom they operate. Once rebuttal
evidence is produced, the presumption vanishes and the trier of fact
must make a decision based on all the evidence without assistance by
the presumption. 4
The opposing theory of presumptions, adopted by the Uniform
Rules of Evidence in 1954," 5 is that a presumption has the effect of
placing the "risk of non-persuasion" as to an issue of fact upon the
party against whom the presumption operates." Grinnell adopts the
Uniform Rules position, and would require defendants to overcome a
risk of non-persuasion that monopoly power does not exist, or that the
monopoly was "thrust upon" them or otherwise legally acquired. The
burden is not merely to produce evidence which would cause the pre-
sumption to vanish and the facts to be determined on all the evidence,
but rather defendant must now prove non-existence of the presumed
fact. Failure to sustain this burden will result in judgment for plain-
tiff. Under Wigmore's premise that risk of non-persuasion is fixed by
law and never shifts, the Grinnell "presumption" changes the rule of
law. There is no longer any need for "the purpose or intent to exercise"
monopoly power. An overwhelming share of a relevant market is per se
illegal monopolization, and defendant can only rebut this presumption
by putting forth facts showing that its overwhelming share of the
market is attributable to "laudable business conduct.127
Applying the rationale of the principal case to other means of deter-
- WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2485 (3d ed. 1940).24 Id. at § 2487.2 5 UNiFoRm RULES or EVIDENCE 14(a).
26 For a general analysis of the "Thayer-Wigmore" presumption theory and the type
of presumption adopted by the Uniform Rule of Evidence, see Laughlin, In Support of
the 77tayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 MicH. L. REv. 195 (1953).
27 236 F. Supp. 244, 257 (D.R.I. 1964).
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mining monopoly power would mean that proof of power to exclude
competitors or control prices would also raise a monopolization pre-
sumption, and only power to exclude or control prices would need be
proved to find monopoly power. There is no reason why such alternate
proof of monopoly power should not also raise the presumption of
monopolization and cast the burden of disproving such charge on the
defendant. There is no less certainty that one who has monopoly power
proved through an ability to exclude competitors or control prices has
achieved such power through section 1 violations or other acts in
restraint of trade.
The probability of such activities is strong enough to require de-
fendant to bring forth evidence to the contrary, but Grinnell changes
what must be proved, not merely who must produce the evidence. In
Wigmore's presumption theory, evidence of price control and exclusion
would still be necessary if the defendant was able to produce contrary
evidence. But under the Grinnell theory, price control and exclusion
need not be proved. The section 2 monopolization charge has thus been
reduced from three elements to two. Deliberateness is no longer an
element of the charge. There is simply a ban on monopoly power in
the economic sense.
Acceptance of monopoly prohibition in the economic sense is to deny
the underlying basis of the Rule of Reason on this point. The Grinnell
theory assumes that faith that a free market will prevent the formation
of monopolies is misplaced, probably because it either does not work or
is not susceptible of adequate enforcement. In essence, Grinnell con-
cludes that it is necessary to absolutely prohibit monopoly as the better
way of insuring a competitive market. The question of saving the
court's time and energy is in fact secondary. The important question is
whether it is now time to re-evaluate the Rule of Reason approach to
the monopoly problem. It has been suggested that the policy of anti-
trust be "protection of competitive process by limiting market power."28
If Grinnell is to be a step in that direction, such a step should be made
openly. The Rule of Reason is not sancrosanct; it can and perhaps
should be changed. Since 1945,29 the courts have looked to market
28 KAYSEN & TURNER, op. cit. supra note. 8.
20 United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); American Tobacco
Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) ; United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) ; United
States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) ; see also preface by
Edward S. Mason in KAYSEN & TURNER, op. cit. supra note 8, at xiii.
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structure as having growing importance in monopolization cases. The
importance of purpose to use, or of past activities, has correspondingly
diminished. Even if restricted to the narrow area of cases where monop-
oly power is found by proof of preponderant control of the relevant
market, the Grinnell decision that such a monopoly is a violation of
section 2 should be openly stated, and not hidden behind a guise of
procedural change.
